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A B S T R A C T
Over the past few decades, transnational and supranational market-based forest governance systems have been
developed to address the complex problems associated with deforestation, by improving the legality and sus-
tainability of timber traded in global markets. This is catalysed by the increasing global production and con-
sumption of timber products and increasing sensitivity of interest groups to how timber products are produced. A
broad range of actors is involved in global production networks. This paper discusses how hierarchies and
networks of power across the timber production network are encountered and negotiated. More specifically, it
investigates the power constellations of wood furniture actors in Indonesia, nested within global production
networks: who holds the power, how power is gained and maintained, and who wins and loses over time. Using
the case of the timber legality assurance system in the context of the European Union Forest Law Enforcement
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, we demonstrate that legality verification in Indonesia is both en-
trenching pre-existing inequitable power relations while producing new modes of elite capture. Legality ver-
ification requires new knowledge and additional costs that are sometimes beyond the capacity of certain (par-
ticularly smaller) furniture manufacturers operators. This has driven a new practice of renting out FLEGT
licenses by larger producers/manufacturers to smaller ones in the country. Although the practice implies po-
tential risks (e.g. fines), large companies in Indonesia manage risk by drawing from pre-existing patronage
relations. They also appear to find the risk worthwhile, as it produces financial gain but moreover, a new form of
control over the market. Meanwhile, small operators and artisanal producers that still aspire to global markets
face disproportionate challenges to engage in legality and are becoming more vulnerable as a result of new
legality measures.
1. Introduction
New policies and market-based mechanisms in the global timber
market have emerged to promote the responsible and wise use of forest
resources (Tacconi, 2012). These stand in contrast to the dominance,
until recently, of more regulatory approaches to forest management and
timber product manufacturing and trading (such as log export bans) in
producer countries. In 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted the
Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan,
which aims reduce illegal logging by improving forest governance and
promoting trade in legally produced timber (EC, 2003). Central to the
initiative are bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs)
between the EU and countries exporting to the EU. VPAs involve the EU
and partner countries agreeing to eliminate illegal timber from the
partner country’s exports to the EU (in practice- exports to all desti-
nations) (Brown, 2008; Maryudi, 2016). Every VPA entails an assurance
system that can verify timber legality. If such a system fully comes into
place, then compliant exporters can merit the award of a 'FLEGT li-
cense', which will be granted through a national licensing authority
established in the producer country. FLEGT was followed by the Eur-
opean Union Timber Regulation No 995/2010 (EUTR), which entered
into force on March 3, 2013. Operators in the EU, exporters to the EU,
and producers under VPAs are obliged to ensure that they trade only
legal timber and wood products with the EU.
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Indonesia has implemented its legality assurance system, locally
referred to as Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (SVLK) since 2009. In
2016, Indonesia became the first VPA country to issue a FLEGT
License,1 with which Indonesian timber products freely enter EU mar-
kets (a so-called ‘green lane’), as they automatically meet EUTR re-
quirements (EU-Commission, 2016; Maryudi, Kurniawan, et al., 2017).
Indonesia supplies approximately a third of the EU’s tropical timber
imports by value (EU-Commission, 2016). Export values have been on
the decline for the past decade (Nurkomariyah et al., 2016).
Before exports, Indonesian wood furniture follows different phases of
production and distribution pathways, involving numerous actors in the
production network (a related perspective to the concepts of value or
commodity chain - see the next section for more), e.g. sawmillers, small or
large manufacturers, traders, wholesalers, and retailers (Purnomo et al.,
2014). Sawmills may include a range of small to large actors responsible
for milling timbers harvested from the forest into more manageable cuts
of wood before further manufactured. Furniture manufacturers include
large companies, small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) and home
industries (Purnomo et al., 2014; Kaplinsky et al., 2003; Nurkomariyah
et al., 2016). They are often responsible for the design of furniture (Roe,
2015), and fulfil design specifications from buyers.
Coe et al. (2008) argue that the core of a production network relates
to transforming inputs into outputs and then distributing them. The input-
output structures between different phases of production and distribution
shape the creation and capture of value along the production network
(Henderson et al., 2002; Coe, Dicken, and Hess, 2008). As Hess (2008)
notes, networks are characterised by unequal distribution of power
among actors. This paper investigates the power constellation of wood
furniture actors in Indonesia, nested within global production networks:
who holds the power, how power is gained and/ or maintained, and who
wins and loses over time. More specifically, we seek to understand
whether and how the implementation of a legality assurance system in
the context of FLEGT interacts with and affects power dynamics.
Legality verification requires new knowledge and additional costs
that are sometimes beyond the capacity of certain operators (see
Setyowati and McDermott, 2016; Maryudi, Nawir, Sumardamto, et al.,
2017). Public data from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018)
shows there are 1343 verified processing, manufacturing and trading
firms (excluding: forest operators, registered-only but not yet verified,
and unconfirmed firm types). This figure represents only a small per
centage of firms in the country, a figure for which reliable data are not
available, however, Ministry of Industry source stated 140,000 firms
(Agro-Indonesia, 2018; Kementrian Perindustrian Republik Indonesia,
2018), which would suggest less than 1% of firms have been verified.
More specifically, nearly two-thirds of them are large operations. This
highlights the enormous challenges facing Indonesian small producers.
Crucially, empirical evidence on 'sustainable' production of small man-
ufacturers, and the sustainability of small-scale versus large-scale pro-
duction is very scant. Of the few current scholarly works, Nurrochmat
et al. (2016) discuss the likely winners and losses of the policy change of
the allocation of timber sources for furniture industries in Central Java
(Indonesia). Hence, investigating how different actors respond to the
new requirements, and adjust their operations, enables us to investigate
who holds power, how they gain and maintain power that ultimately
results in the winners and losers in the production networks.
2. Theoretical frames: Power within global production networks
(GPNs) governance
Authority and control over natural resources have broadly evolved
over time. They have increasingly shifted beyond the state (Rhodes,
1997; Maryudi, Nurrochmat, and Giessen, 2018). Jessop (2011, 108)
defines the new conception as “the structures and practices involved in
coordinating social relations that are marked by complex, reciprocal
interdependence, and meta governance refers in turn to the coordina-
tion of these structures and practices”. In talking about governance as
process, structure, practice, and space, the importance of the relations
among actors becomes a critical point of enquiry. ‘Governance’ is about
the “spaces in which power is encountered and negotiated” (Newman,
2005, 4), which evokes both a more broad enquiry into the range of
actors that can be involved, and a deeper enquiry into the hierarchies
and networks of power brokering within research boundaries.
This new way of understanding governance fits well with the con-
text of the production and distribution of a commodity for a market.
Markets are not only commercial exchanges (transfers of good, prop-
erty, and money), but also the practices that enable such exchanges to
take place (Sayer, 2002; North, 1991). The global production networks
(GPN) framework attempts to explain input-output structures involving
various actors (Henderson et al., 2002). It extends from more conven-
tional perspectives such as Global Commodity Chains and Global Value
Chains, which tend to focus less on polycentric notions of power (Bair,
2009; Coe and Hess, 2006, 2013). In GPNs, a broad range of actors
interact, with own interests and agendas, seeking influence to capture
value. In that context, Levy (2008) argues that GPNs are not simply
chains of value-adding activities; they relate how authorities are con-
structed within markets and their associated distribution of resources.
Thus, ‘governance’ is about the power relations that result in winners
and losers within the networks (Hess, 2008).
The new conceptualisation of power in GPN governance recognises
power relations in a production system are complex (Coe and Hess,
2013). While large companies typically hold great influence over GPNs,
other actors may also wield powerful tools (Gibbon and Ponte, 2008).
For instance, Myers (2015) found that intermediaries had immense
control over the supply of resources, but lacked influence on the po-
licies that affect trade. They can also squeeze significant profits out of
producers (Maryudi et al., 2015; Myers, 2015). In GPN governance
thinking, power may be centred or de-centred and is subject to change
(cf. Hess, 2008). This is a marked shift from conceptualisations of
governance and power in predecessors to GPNs (‘value chains’ and
‘commodity networks’) in that an enquiry into governance must go
beyond static assumptions of power, and rather examine how power is
gained and maintained or lost.
Power is manifested in relational effects of social interaction in
which actors seek mechanisms to gain and maintain access to, and
control over, benefits (Coe et al., 2004; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This
conception of power is also embedded within the concept of access,
which is defined as “a bundle of power” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).
Control of access and the ability to benefit from something, as Ribot and
Peluso (2003) conceptualise, can respectively be equated to “power
over” and “power to” in the power literature (Lukes, 2005). In GPN
governance, actors may influence regulatory structures, control critical
resources, and construct discursive legitimacy (Levy, 2008; Hardy and
Phillips, 1998; Peppard and Rylander, 2006); this reflects the general
dynamics of power (Levy, 2008). For example, product standards are
often at the centre of intense struggles as they facilitate or hinder the
participation of particular actors (Bolwig et al., 2010). In the context of
FLEGT, large producers in some countries have lobbied governments to
institute cumbersome harvest regulations which drive small-scale log-
gers and producers into illegality (Obidzinski et al., 2014). With regard
to critical resources, contacts with and information about international
buyers are usually controlled by large firms or associations that create
dependencies among smaller manufacturers (Purnomo et al., 2011).
FLEGT may further reshape forest discourse resulting in the changing
power relations in favour of or against certain actors (Ochieng,
Visseren-Hamakers, and Nketiah, 2013).1 Exports to other countries than the EU members use V-Legal documents. In
this paper, FLEGT License and V-Legal, and legality requirements, are used
interchangeably.
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3. Research methods
This research followed critical social science approaches to justice
complement the normative approaches of legal scholars and philoso-
phers (eg. Rawls, 1999). Critical social science approaches do not start
from a particular theoretical position, such as Rawls’ theory of justice as
fairness, but instead, compare and contrast people’s actual claims about
(in)justice (Walker, 2012; Sikor, 2013).
To answer our research questions, we conducted 100 in-depth in-
terviews (Table 1) with timber manufacturers (small, medium, large
manufacturers, as well as exporters and non-exporters), intermediaries,
and exporters from three main furniture producing regions in Java Is-
land: Jepara District, the Greater of Surakarta (Solo, Klaten and Suko-
harjo Districts), and Special Region of Yogyakarta (Sleman, Gu-
nungkidul, Yogyakarta and Bantul Districts), with some additional
interviews in the timber producing regions of Blora and Rembang,
where the occurrence of illegal cutting is high. We also interviewed 40
representatives from associations, policy-makers (at national and sub-
national levels), NGOs (at national and local levels), and key informants
from a variety of organisations/institutions dealing with legality ver-
ification in Indonesia that include verification bodies and independent
monitoring networks.
We started our investigation by interviewing key informants, who
we also asked to identify actors whom we could interview within the
production network. From there, we followed these actors’ trading
partners both upstream and downstream. We used our own experience
and professional judgements in selecting non-industry respondents who
may provide insight into power issues in furniture production networks
in Indonesia (e.g. government regulators, industry associations, NGOs
etc, which are not involved in trading directly, but play an important
role in governance and are in a position to provide insights). The first
author has been involved in FLEGT and legality policy since the for-
mative phase. In each interview, we focussed on governance and justice
issues. For market-actors (corporates, manufacturers and wood traders)
we also asked about how they operate, the market conditions (e.g.
sales), and changes, if any, prior and after the implementation of leg-
ality verification in Indonesia. We further employed content analysis on
media, specifically on the issues of fairness and the impacts of legality
verification in Indonesia. We acknowledge a limitation in our data
pertaining to the ability to measure change in key indicators, like profit
for example, pre and post SVLK/FLEGT, however propose that our
qualitative analysis provides insight into these issues and are more
useful to understand the core of our paper: which is about changes in
the power relations among actors.
4. Global furniture markets and production networks in Indonesia
This section briefly discusses the global trade of furniture and the
extent to which Indonesian furniture is nested within. It also provides a
brief overview the general market conditions and the domestic pro-
duction structures, which are characterised by a high number of in-
formal small-medium scale manufacturers/home industries, and their
reliance on large firms for export operations.
Global trade of furniture has grown from USD 94 billion in 2009 to
USD 135 billion in 2014 (CSIL, 2016) and USD 140 billion in 2016
(UNECE, 2017). In both production and consumption, the global South
is increasingly dominant (UNECE, 2017; Purnomo et al., 2009). Middle
and low-income countries have assumed more than half of global fur-
niture production since 2010. This shift is remarkable considering that
in 2003, three-quarters of furniture production was in high-income
countries. By 2012, almost 60 per cent of production was in middle to
low-income countries, dominated by China (Renda et al., 2014). The
share of furniture consumption in high-income countries has also
dropped, from 82 per cent in 2003 to 53 per cent in 2012 (Renda et al.,
2014). In 2016. the biggest importers in Europe were Germany, France,
and the UK (UNECE, 2017).
Over the past twenty years, Indonesia has been one of the major ex-
porters of furniture but its position in the global trade has dropped sig-
nificantly (Nurkomariyah, Firdaus, and Nurrochmat, 2016). In 2015, with
trade values of USD 1.81 billion, it ranked only the 25th, dropping from
the 5th in 2000 (Salim and Munadi, 2017). Respondents reported closures
of some manufacturing firms over the past few years. Recent estimates
show that there are more than 100,000 primary and downstream pro-
cessing industries; 95 per cent of them are SMEs (Purnomo et al., 2014).
Most timber processing industries are labour-intensive and tend to operate
in clusters (Melati, Purnomo, and Shantiko, 2013). The National Statistics
Bureau estimates that small-scale wood and handicraft enterprises employ
up to 1.5 million people (BPS, 2015). Further, a large proportion of the
companies are unregistered (i.e. informal). For instance, in the Special
Region of Yogyakarta, unregistered manufacturers make up approximately
75% of the total furniture enterprises (Obidzinski et al., 2014).
Indonesian small-scale furniture manufacturing industries supply
both domestic and international markets (Andadari, 2008). Most furni-
ture companies are export-oriented. Domestic markets are estimated to
only absorb 6–10% of the production although several manufacturers
started to target them over the past few years (Salim and Munadi, 2017).
For domestic markets, they supply a network of furniture shops across
the country. Marketing is based on contacts between networks of small
firms and specific traders that are linked to specific furniture shops
(Burger and Smit, 2001; Purnomo et al., 2014; Purnomo et al., 2009).
Internationally, they act as subcontractors and are involved in produc-
tion networks managed by large firms and traders (Kusmantini, Guritno,
and Rustamaji, 2015) due to lack of marketing skills and information
(Purnomo et al., 2014; Van Geenhuizen and Indarti, 2005; Maryudi et al.,
2015, 2017). Subcontracting allows small firms to concentrate on pro-
duction and leave the management and the risk of the market, with its
changing tastes and fashions, to the lead firms and merchants (Burger
and Smit, 2001). In most cases, production, models, quality, and other
requirements are pre-determined by the buyers (Andadari, 2008), which
are often subsidiaries of overseas retailers (Purnomo et al., 2014).
With regard to the exports, a small number of large firms and tra-
ders make contracts with global buyers, wholesalers or retailers. They
play an important role as a trade hub, and therefore have high bar-
gaining position vis-à-vis small manufacturers (Purnomo et al., 2014). In
the past, as Kato (2005) argues, they exercised power and gained strong
Table 1
List of interviews.
No Actor types Number of
interviewees
Notes
1 Sawmillers 10 Both registered & informal
2 Wood traders/
intermediaries
15
3 Furniture
manufacturers
- Small & medium
scale
30 20 of which are exporters
- Large scale 15
- Artisans/home
industries
25
4 Chainsaw men 5 Individual illegal loggers
5 Associations 5
6 NGOs & civil society
groups
6
7 Policy makers
- National 4
- Sub national 12
8 Verification bodies 5
9 Donors 3 United Kingdom-Indonesia’s
Multistakoholders Forestry
Programme
10 Academics 2
11 Consultants 3
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influence in the production-distribution networks through steering the
exports registration body Badan Revitalisasi Industri Kayu (BRIK, In-
donesian Institute for the Revitalization of the Timber Industry).2 As
registered exporters (Eksportir Terdaftar Produk Industri Kehutanan,
ETPIK), they controlled timber exports and brokered local manu-
facturers with international buyers. With the introduction of SVLK,
ETPIK registration is no longer in place. Exports can now be conducted
by any manufacturer or trader with either a FLEGT License or a V-Legal
depending on the destination (V-Legal - Verified Legal - is for non-EU
destinations). Under the current regulation, non-manufacturers remain
eligible for legality verification and conducting exports, so long as the
products are supplied by legally-verified manufacturers.
5. Production network governance in the era of legality
requirements
The first part of this section briefly discusses Indonesia’s exports
following the implementation of legality verification. It reveals how
national level data is insufficient in capturing dynamics in production-
distribution networks and changes in power relationships and business
operations. The ensuing two parts analyse the different experience by
small manufacturers and large firms based on our interviews- how they
respond to the legality policy - and reveal the power constellation of
wood furniture actors in Indonesia, who wins and who loses. In these
parts, we show that the renting of certificates has become evident fol-
lowing the imposition of new legality complexities, the reasons why
small manufacturers rent, and then why big ones rent out, and how
these reinforce the pre-existing patronage relations.
5.1. Indonesia’s exports following legality verification
Access to, and integration of, Indonesian timber products in global
markets have proven to be two of the thorniest issues since the
Government of Indonesia commenced FLEGT VPA preparation (for-
mulating a legality policy) and subsequent negotiations with the EU.
The formal interests of the central forest bureaucracy relate to broad
goals of improving domestic forest governance through eradicating il-
licit forest activities (ID-108). During the VPA negotiations, the
Government of Indonesia also articulated its interests in enhanced sales
in European markets through the eventual agreement (Maryudi, 2016).
Concerns about the adverse impacts of legality verification raised by
small forest operators and artisanal timber manufacturers emerged as a
major concern during the formative phase of the national legality
system (Setyowati and McDermott, 2016; Lomax, 2014; Nurrochmat
et al., 2016). Although this was later responded to with streamlined
standards for small operations, the concerns did not come to end.
Following the full implementation of the legality system, the forest
authority regularly provides updates on exports of forest products using
V-Legal licenses, in terms of volume and values, indicating that both
have increased. A high-ranking official with the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry said that the exports’ values in 2015 in-
creased by nearly 50 per cent of the previous year, from US$6.6 billion
to US$9.9 billion (BisnisIndonesia, 2016). The export values also in-
creased from 15.73 million tonnes in 2015 to 17.46 million tonnes in
the following year (Endarwati, 2017). Focusing on the national ag-
gregates, in terms of both metrics and values, ignores key political
dynamics within the production networks at the national and local le-
vels. While the production networks are quite complex and char-
acterised by power asymmetries among actors, as previously discussed,
the data are not sufficient to reveal who within the networks enjoy the
most benefits and who become disadvantaged. As an online database of
the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (2018) shows, legally-verified
processing, manufacturing and trading entities are dominated by large
firms (processing over 6000m3 per year) representing 858 (63.9%) of
1344 firms. In contrast, only four (0.3%) of verified firms are home
industries.
In our interviews, informants from the government bureaucracies,
verification bodies and donor agencies (ID-114, 027, 104, 106, 108)
remain enthusiastic about the improved integration of small manu-
facturers in global markets. They indicated that the implementation of
legality verification reduces the reliance of small firms and manu-
facturers on large traders/ exporters by linking them directly with in-
ternational buyers. They further claimed that international buyers ac-
tively sought information on legally-verified manufacturers regardless
of the size of their operations (ID-106). However, political uproars and
strong resistance from the national association of small furniture and
handicraft manufacturers (Asosiasi Mebel dan Kerajinan Indonesia/
AMKRI) cast a shadow over the enthusiasm of the state and large
companies. The association claims that legality verification puts more
financial burdens on small operations and impedes their integration in
the global markets (see Purukan, 2015). This partly explains the several
delays for the full implementation of the legality policy during which
SMEs were only required to make a declaration (Deklarasi Ekspor/DE)
that the exported products originated from legal sources rather than
meet the full eligibility requirements for SVLK.
Our data show that different GPN actors experience timber legality
in different ways. Regarding changes in sales volumes and prices, our
respondents, both domestic and export-oriented manufacturers/ tra-
ders, suggested both a decline (ID-125, 126, 144) and an increase (ID-
16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 40, 145). However, a number of SMEs are re-
ported to have experienced hard times and were facing much stiffer
competition in the global markets from cheaper products in other ex-
porting countries, which do not impose a similar legality policy (see
Anon, 2015). Therefore, statistical improvements in export volumes or
sales hardly reflect how individual companies have been affected by
timber legality laws. We therefore concentrate on exploring some of
these differential experiences in our empirical discussions below.
5.2. Small manufacturers and artisans: Renting legality certificates as a
survival strategy
Legality requirements increase expenditures associated with
changes in operations (e.g. the elaboration of more detailed inventory
documentation and employee training) as well as actual verification
and surveillance costs. Although the legality requirements for small
operators have been made much simpler than the standards for the
larger and more integrated operators (Maryudi et al., 2015), numerous
respondents described the burdensome registration procedures,3 in
terms of time and financial investment, as a primary reason behind
their reluctance to pursue legality verification. Recent efforts to sim-
plify registration procedures4 do not allay fears among informal man-
ufacturers (MFP, 2015). Small manufacturers, particularly home
2 This body was formally charged with charged with monitoring and ver-
ifying of legal timber(Maryudi, 2015; Cashore et al., 2016), but ensured the
interests of its own members by setting permits and quotas of exports (Kato,
2005; Luttrell et al., 2011).
3 SMEs are required to obtain the following documents: Building
Construction Permit (Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan/IMB), Deed of establishment,
Trading Business Permit (Surat Ijin Usaha Perdagangan/SIUP) or Industrial
Registration Number (Tanda Daftar Industri/TDI), Environmental disturbance
permit (HO permit), Company Registration Number (Tanda Daftar Perusahaan/
TDP), Taxpayer Identification Number (Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak/NPWP),
Environmental Impact Analysis and Monitoring Activities, Industrial Raw
Material Fulfilment Planning (Rencana Pemenuhan Bahan Baku Industri/RPBBI).
Application of those documents are sequential in nature. For example, IMB is
required for their HO application.
4 Several district governments started to restructure their bureaucracy
through integrated one-stop services (Layanan Terpadu Satu Atap) in part to
expedite SVLK implementation.
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industries, remain constrained by the poor documentation and admin-
istration of raw materials, timber balance (input and output), products
and orders, all of which are crucial for legality verification. While some
of these actors may turn their attention to domestic markets (which still
requires proof of timber legality, but is subject to less scrutiny), many of
them derive significant sales through sub-contracts from exporting
companies and therefore engage in ‘renting legality’. A company re-
presentative (ID-124) explained that they would need to employ at least
two trained workers to process administrative requirements, whose
salaries might compromise profits. Formal safety and health standards
are also seen as too costly (see Yovi and Nurrochmat, 2018). Finally,
exposure to the taxation office is perceived as a significant threat to
profit margins (Maryudi et al., 2014). By keeping their business un-
registered, small manufacturers can avoid paying taxes for any trans-
actions (e.g. ID-91).
In order to meet legality verification requirements, some small
manufacturers we interviewed (ID-20, 40, 41, 46) rely on expensive
‘legality consultants’, who offer their services to ensure their clients
confirm to legality requirements. These consultants, charge IDR
100–150 million (USD 7300–11,000) depending on the size of the
business.5 Even when the legality certificate is secured, it must be
maintained through monitoring, which costs an added IDR 25–30
million (USD 2000–2500) every other year. We found frequent re-
ference to small furniture business closures, citing the implementation
of legality policy as one of the main driving factors (see Anon, 2015).
Our research also found that several actively exporting manufacturers
(ID-09, 11), simply quit the timber business. An exporter (ID-11) gave
some insight into the broad implications of legality verification:
“timber business is now becoming unbearable with so many requirements
that keep changing and increasing. The legality verification is too much
for us. Not only the financial consequences, it obliges us to change our
day to day practices, it’s complicated and indeed costly. At the same
time, we don’t see any significant benefits by engaging in legality. Better
for us to completely quit the business. I observe more promising business
with less complicated procedures and requirements.”
In response to the multiple burdens presented by legality require-
ments especially on small manufacturers, the practice of renting V-
Legal and/ or FLEGT-License legality certificates has arisen. This ap-
pears to be a new iteration of past efforts to bypass legality procedures:
under the aforementioned BRIK and ETPIK in which export certificates
were sold illegally on the black market (see Colchester et al., 2006;
Gellert, 2010; Myers, 2015). Certificate renting was confirmed by sev-
eral manufacturers on both the renting out and receiving ends (ID-117,
121, 122, 124, 126). Civil society groups (ID 107, 109), verification
bodies (ID-106) and donors (ID-108, 123) also acknowledged this
practice. In an attempt to downplay the magnitude of the practice, a
respondent from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (ID-92) ar-
gued that the legality verification may take time to properly function.
Certificate renting occurs for a number of reasons. The primary
rationales we found in interviews were (1) bureaucratic avoidance, and
(2) limited access to financing. We explore these issues now.
First, as previously mentioned, legality verification involves addi-
tional technical and managerial complexities. A small manufacturer
(ID-122) suggested that he is forced to follow the practice because
“exports are complicated. [I] do not have the knowledge. [I] do not know the
tax regulations. [It is] much simpler relying on larger companies as they will
deal with the required processes including how to deal with the customs”.
Another company representative (ID-126) added the exporting com-
pany will look after all of the necessary documents for his exports; he
just provides data such as the products, specification, and volume.
Second, limited access to financing encourages SMEs to borrow the
legality certificate for the exports of their products. This is a main driver
for many small manufacturers. According to respondents, managers and
owners behave rationally, exercising the best possible return from their
business. Small manufacturers and artisans with less frequent exports
see renting legality certificate as the much cheaper option despite the
fact that it also pushes their profits down. One small-scale manufacturer
(ID-124) gave detailed insights:
“Before having SVLK, we used the certificate owned by other companies.
We just needed to pay them. In addition, there are some non-producer
companies that provide services for non-certified industries. We pay IDR
4.5 million IDR / container. Many small industries in [this region] use
such service as they do not have their own SVLK. I am unsure whether or
not the practice is forbidden, but there are many (small) industries that
use that. For small industries, they prefer [renting] the legality certificate
as it is much cheaper. Assuming they only export 5-10 times a year,
[renting] a certificate is much cheaper than an SVLK which could cost
them 50 million IDR. In addition, they do not need to employ additional
workers to deal with SVLK. For doing that, they need two employees, who
are paid in total 48 million IDR per year. Requirements for SVLK are
complex, e.g. for documentation. Small industries are not used to that.
So, there are two main reasons why small industries do not apply SVLK:
the costs and the complicated procedures and administration, which also
costs a lot. On top of that, they do not need to worry about taxes. When
we use the certificate of other companies, we need to provide photos of
products that will be shipped and the packing lists, the products and their
volume”
5.3. Large companies and exporters: Renting legality licences for
accumulating more financial benefits and enhancing control in the markets
Small producers saw using larger exporter’s FLEGT or V-Legal cer-
tificates as a strategy for survival in the face of the financial burdens
and administrative complexities of legality verification and new trading
regulations. By so doing, however, they make themselves more vul-
nerable. Large firms and exporters renting their licenses are perfectly
positioned to capture more benefits and consolidate their control and
power in the GPN. During the BRIK era, exporters of timber products
were distinguished into: producing and non-producing ETPIK holders;
both collected timber products from small firms and artisans and acted
as a ‘forwarder’ or intermediary to global markets. Although ETPIK is
no longer required for exports, legality regulations still allow pure in-
termediaries (non-producers) to apply for legality verification and thus
conduct exports under the requirement that they establish contracts
with legally-verified producers.
We identified several mechanisms by which large exporting firms,
both intermediaries and producers, rented their legality certificate and
continued to act as powerful actors in the GPN networks. Several re-
spondents suggested that many of the current legally-verified inter-
mediaries were the large exporters holding non-producing ETPIK
holders under the previous BRIK system. They either conduct minor
finishing activities to be categorised as a producer (ID-123) or are fic-
titious manufacturing firms that barely have production activities (ID-
109) to absorb products from non-legal suppliers. As previously said,
non-manufacturers are only eligible for legality verification with sup-
plies from legally verified sources. Manufacturing exporters mix their
legally verified and non-legally verified products supplied by small
operations. One key informant (ID-123) detailed the technical com-
plexities for auditors to check products when a certain exporter has
numerous suppliers, which may even operate in distant regions. Audits
may not reach the minimum number required for checking because the
verification fees are often set low in the lights of competition among
verification bodies. Aside from (illegally) renting certificates to small
producers, large firms may deal with buyers who directly purchase
products from legally-verified producers (ID-121). Other firms also
exported more products by using the legal certificate of other produ-
cers. This practice is to avoid more substantive investments in a new5 This figure includes the costs of actual legality verification.
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registration as a larger operation and a new verification with a different
set and more robust standards.
There are risks, as renting certificates violates regulations. One re-
spondent from a verification body insisted that renting certificates
cannot be tolerated; he suggested that there have been cases of both
suspension and withdrawals of legality licenses. As previously men-
tioned however, relaxed verification procedures, particularly by those
with a large number of clients, still opens opportunities for exporters to
continue the practices in the hopes of substantive profits and other
benefits relating to controls in the GPN (ID-123). One respondent (ID-
109) suggested that these companies earn money from “the business of
legal certificates” by renting the documents for exports to small firms.
Several small manufacturers we interviewed (ID -121, 122, 124, 125,
126) highlighted that by renting legality licenses, large firms squeeze
IDR 4–8 million (USD 300–600) per container. This figure makes up
approximately 5–10% of the export value, depending on the products.
More importantly, certificate holding companies require sensitive
business information from the smaller companies using their certifi-
cates in order to comply with SVLK. They therefore gain information on
the sale prices and client details. Some smaller manufacturers suggested
that under SVLK, they were disconnected from their international
buyers after renting legality documents from other exporters since the
market transaction is now through an intermediary rather than directly
as before SVLK. This gives rise for the potential of large business to at
very least outprice their smaller competitors, or attempt to woo the
clients into buying from them. Although they were unsure of the exact
driver, export intermediaries often mentioned either the low quality of
their products or “recessions in international markets” so that the
buyers had made no more purchases. One certificate borrower (ID-91)
provided more candid insights:
“I have been doing exports of furniture for about twenty years, experi-
encing ups and downs in the business. I have been borrowing legality
certificate from larger firms to conduct exports. Using their certificates, I
was able to export 10-12 containers a year to Germany, France, Italy,
and the Netherlands. It lasted only three years. Since 2014, I have lost all
of my European buyers. It is a high possibility that my European buyers
are now served by the certificate lenders. While I still borrow legality
certificate from another large firm, now I can only export 2-3 containers
a year to Asian buyers. Even so, I am unsure if I can maintain this export
activity”
While getting responses from large firms was extremely difficult in
our study, one key informant from the Multistakeholder Forestry
Programme (ID-124) also added that the certificate owners are effec-
tively “hijacking information on the buyers”. He provided examples in
which larger companies stole the knowledge on the buyers and trading
system. Several of them took advantage of this new-found access to
market relations during the transitional phase of the declaration of
exports that was intended for small manufacturers. An investigation
report by the Indonesian Independent Forest Monitoring Network (JPIK
2016) reveals that they used names of SMEs and even falsified the
declaration documents to confirm V-Legal certification. Another re-
spondent (ID-109) concluded that the certificate lenders are the win-
ners in the networks.
“When purchasing products from small manufacturers, the payment is
made after they got the money from the buyers. So basically they need zero
capital, only the ability or knowledge on the markets, and the ability to
violate SVLK regulations. They are big because they know the markets net-
works.“
6. Discussion
Producing, distributing and integrating timber products in the
global economy involves a broad range of actors. The way they influ-
ence the networks and compete for the capture of the values created in
the networks represent power relations (Coe and Hess, 2013). In this
paper, we questioned whether or not the implementation of timber
legality verification, framed under FLEGT initiative, changed the power
constellation of wood furniture actors in Indonesia, nested within
global production networks; and how the actors behave and respond to
the changes with regard to their respective business operations.
FLEGT has an objective on stimulating good forest governance in-
cluding the good intention to reform the forest power constellation. We
found that legality verification perpetuates the hegemony of large
manufacturers and exporters by utilising their know-how capacities and
capitalising on the inability of their smaller competitors to engage in
legality verification. In other VPA partners, such as Cameroon and
Ghana, FLEGT is also perceived to result in further expansion and
power concentration of the already dominant large industries
(Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014; Wiersum and Elands, 2013). In a dif-
ferent context, smallholder timber producers in Indonesia are also said
to be at to be disadvantaged by the implementation of legality policy
(Maryudi, Nawir, Sekartaji, et al., 2017; Nurrochmat et al., 2016;
Maryudi, Nawir, Sumardamto, et al., 2017).
Over the past few decades, large firms continued to reinforce their
power in creating, enhancing and capturing value in global production
networks (Dauvergne and Lister, 2010). Our study found that larger-
scale actors possess more competences in terms of accumulating
knowledge (see also Malerba, 2002), and controlling strategic resources
(see also Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). In our case,
this was evidenced in meeting the legality requirements for exports
under the FLEGT regime. The unequal distribution of power is ex-
acerbated by the way small manufacturers find strategic advantages or
are forced to partner with their larger competitors. This change in
network structure furthers the disintegration of smaller producers from
the global economy.
There might be arguments that legality verification policy in
Indonesia could be accessible for all types of actors after the im-
plementation of a more streamlined set of standards for small opera-
tions. Our research reveals that to engage in legality verification, small
industries are constrained with technical, administrative, organisa-
tional, knowledge and financial barriers that further weaken their
bargaining positions in the global networks. There is a growing un-
derstanding that the number of disadvantaged small manufacturers is
significant, as so far only a small fraction of furniture manufacturers
have been legally verified. Although detailed statistics are unavailable
due the lack of registration of many of these business (the number of
companies registered for legality verification is known, but the total
number of companies is not known, and due to the complicated nature
of contract and home-industry arrangements, numbers of companies
are not representative of the total number of actors engaged in the
sector).
More importantly, our research revealed how companies reacted to
their limitations to participate in the timber and wood product busi-
ness. Several operators resigned in a signal of acceptance that legality
verification surpassed their capacities, eventually switching their focus
to domestic markets or even closing down their businesses. We iden-
tified a number of small firms that adapted the legality policy by
renting legality licenses to stay connected with the global economy,
albeit at arm’s length from buyers. These actors saw borrowing legality
certificates as a strategy of survival to deal with the administrative
hassles of legality verification, trading regulations, and the associated
costs.
In contrast, larger firms have organisational and financial strengths
to engage in legality verification directly. We found that possessing
legality certificates further enhanced their bargaining positions in the
production networks. They captured more value in the GPN by bro-
kering legality by lending their certificate to small suppliers and
squeezing profits out of them. Coe et al. (2004) argue that “value can
take the form of technological rents by way of access to particular
product or process technologies”. There are indeed risks and potential
sanctions of such practices, notably the suspension or cancellation of
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their certificates. Many large firms utilised loopholes in the legality
policy to mask their illegal operations, principally through the ‘con-
tractual mechanisms’ with small manufacturers in which they subsume
timber for which legality is unclear into inventory that is verified as
legal (see Acheampong and Maryudi, forthcoming for more strategies to
use loopholes in policy).
7. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Our findings have far-reaching implications that are under-re-
cognised. VPAs are implemented to provide a range of benefits, in-
cluding economic opportunities to local timber enterprises (Carodenuto
and Cerutti, 2014). We make it clear that FLEGT further entrenches
power constellations in the production networks as large operations
continue to enjoy more benefits and control (Eba’a Atyi et al., 2013).
We have shown that more powerful traders are able to extract addi-
tional fees from smaller actors and gain access to valuable client and
pricing data in the process. While differential powers among actors
would exist without FLEGT (and indeed did before) we suggest that
there are several ways in which these imbalances are exacerbated due
to the FLEGT VPAs. This reinforces the argument that FLEGT VPAs are
yet another forestry sector intervention that, problematically, relies on
market-based mechanisms to resolve problems in large part created by
those same mechanisms (Rutt et al., forthcoming). In addition, actors
envision FLEGT and SVLK as policy instruments to improve forest
governance, e.g. eliminating illegal practices, corruption, and to pro-
vide credible assurance to end consumers about how the timber pro-
ducts they use originating from responsible (legal) practices. Without
addressing the possible positive changes to forest governance as a result
of SVLK and FLEGT, which are outside the scope of this paper, our
findings on renting legality documents illuminate challenges to improve
the credibility of the system. Earlier, FLEGT and legality verification
was hypothesised as providing a foothold for sustainability by im-
proving the domestic forest governance (Benjamin Cashore and Stone,
2012). It is also praised for improving benefits for the private sectors in
EU’s VPA partner countries (Carodenuto and Cerutti, 2014).
Our analysis does not disregard the potential of FLEGT to enhance
timber product governance and possibly even reduce illegal logging.
However, we provide insights for policy-makers to improve governance
arrangements to ensure that new accountability systems do not gain
legality traceability at the cost of incentivising corruption and further
concentrating power within the GPN actors. The central policy issue
that SVLK is designed in such a way that it provides opportunities for
the larger companies to become more powerful and presents challenges
for smaller actors. There has been considerable debate in Indonesia in
the design and implementation of SVLK, especially in relation to the
burden that it places on smaller actors, and our findings support ex-
ploring further options to develop less financially and administratively
burdensome processes for these actors so they can remain competitive
without being compelled to engage in the loopholes we have framed as
‘renting legality’. Devising a pro-small actor timber legality verification
system would entail simplifying processes, providing increased capacity
building to navigate the simplified processes, and reducing the cost
burden for engaging in verification processes.
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